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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CARL N. SMITH and, 1 
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. ] 
1 BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 880661-CA 
Priority 14b 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code Annotated, and 
Rule 3a, Rules of Utah Court of Appeals, and Section 5 of Article 
VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Judgment of the District 
Court of Duchesne County, Honorable Dennis L. Draney presiding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows: 
1. Was the defendant unreasonable and arbitrary in its 
placement of the road, well-site and storage tanks battery? 
2. Did the Court err in failing to assess damages 
based on the highest and best use of the said tract, to-wit, 
residential purposes? 
3. Did the Court err in failing to allow plaintiffs 
severance damages? 
4. Did the Court err in determining that the tract 
taken had a possible residual value of $375 per acre? 
5. Did the Court err in determining the fair market 
value of the property based not upon the testimony of the expert 
witnesses, but rather by the Court's own adjustment to isolated 
comparables referred to by the expert witnesses? 
6. Did the Court err in refusing to allow the 
plaintiffs prejudgment interest? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: This is an action by plaintiffs/ 
appellants for damages sustained when defendant entered upon 
plaintiffs' property and constructed a well, well platform, access 
road and battery. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: This action was tried without a 
jury before the Honorable Dennis L. Draney on April 5 and 6, 1988. 
At the conclusion of trial the Court directed that the parties 
submit their Closing Arguments in writing, together with a Post-
trial Memorandum, which plaintiffs/appellants submitted and served 
on April 22, 1988. Thereafter defendant/respondent served its 
Closing Argument and Post-trial Memorandum on May 5, 1988. 
Plaintiffs/appellants served their Reply Memorandum thereto on 
May 13, 1988. 
The Court rendered its Ruling in writing dated June 8, 
1988, and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment on September 12, 1988. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT; The Court found that at 
the time of defendant's entry the well-site, battery storage tanks 
and road had "growing crops" thereon within the meaning of the 
applicable lease provision, that the use to which defendant put 
the 4.76 acres was of such nature and duration that it rendered 
the property unusable to the plaintiffs for agricultural purposes 
in the foreseeable future, and that such damage to growing crops 
and to the land for agricultural purposes amounted to virtually a 
total taking of the property by defendant. The Court found the 
fair market value of the property at the time of defendant's entry 
to be $3,750 per acre and found that the property had a "possible" 
residual value of $375 per acre, and that therefore the damage to 
plaintiffs was $3,375 per acre multiplied by 4.76 acres and 
awarded a judgment to the plaintiffs of $16,065. The Court 
further found that because defendant's taking of the well-site, 
battery storage tanks and road was for an "uncertain period of 
time," and that therefore "damages cannot be measured as of a 
certain time or according to certain figures," and accordingly 
declined to allow plaintiffs prejudgment interest. The Court 
further declined to allow plaintiffs damages based on a fair 
market value for residential purposes as opposed to agricultural 
purposes, declined to award plaintiffs severance damages, and 
found that defendant's choice of the well-site was "reasonable and 
practical" and that defendant acted in "good faith." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs/appellants ("plaintiffs" hereafter) are 
owners of the fee interest in the subject parcel of real property 
located in Section 25, Township 1 South, Range 4 West, Uintah Base 
& Meridian containing 20 acres. (Exhibits 1 & 11, R.608-10) 
Respondent/defendant ("defendant" hereafter) is the 
lessee of the rights to oil and gas on the subject property as 
successor in interest to a lease entered into by plaintiffs' 
parents March 29, 1966, and duly recorded in the office of the 
Duchesne County Recorder. (Ex. 12, 17 & 19; R.611, 678 & 679) 
In mid-August 1983 defendant came upon plaintiffs' land 
and installed an oil well, oil well battery and storage tanks 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "well-site") in the 
southwest corner of the rectangular tract, building a fifty-foot 
wide road as access thereto from a county road which abuts the 
property, using 4.76 acres of plaintiffs' land. (Ex. 3; R.201, 
198) 
The Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining spacing order 
required the well in Section 25 to be north of a 660-foot line 
parallel to the south section line and east of a 660-foot line 
parallel to the west section line unless a variance were obtained 
from the Division (R.181). The latter parallel line demarks the 
west boundary of plaintiffs' property. (Ex. 1) Such a variance 
had been applied for on other sites by defendant, but no such 
consideration was entertained by it and its agents in this 
instance, and defendant made preliminary efforts at locating the 
well on land to the south of plaintiffs on property owned by the 
Duchesne County School Board, but abandoned that effort and 
elected to drill on plaintiffs1 land. (R.185-88) Defendant's 
managing engineer, Edward Whicker, testified that in addition to 
the school property on the south, as far as the spacing order was 
concerned, the well could also have been located on the Taylor 
property to the east of plaintiffs and could, with a variance, 
have been located on the Leonard Wall property to the west of 
plaintiffs' land. (R.183-4) 
Defendant fenced the east border of the access road and 
the north and east borders of the well-site (the transcript says 
"trenched," rather than "fenced," but the context demands—and the 
actual testimony was "fenced"). (R.199) Sometime in 1985 the 
fence on the east border of the well-site was shifted to the west 
after defendant covered its drilling pit, exposing approximately 
1.3 9 acres of land. (R.706) The surface was never restored by 
defendant as defendant's agent, Whicker, himself admitted, and he 
opined that it would not be restored until defendant had abandoned 
the well and the site was "reclaimed." (R.200) When plaintiff, 
Carl Smith, was asked if the exposed land was restored to its 
original condition since the removal of the fence, he answered, 
"Far from that." (R.630) 
In May 1983 defendant hired James Curtis to make an 
appraisal of the 20-acre parcel and provided him a metes and 
bounds description of the 4.76-acre parcel in the very location 
where the well was ultimately located from which to do his 
computations. (R.300) Curtis1 appraisal was submitted by Whicker 
to plaintiffs with defendant's first, and what proved to be its 
only, offer of payment for damages sometime in the month of July 
1983. (R.732) 
Also, in July Whicker met with plaintiffs on the subject 
property, and Whicker showed plaintiffs where the well was to go. 
(R.227-8) Whicker admitted that location had been predetermined 
by himself and his boss, Bob Lewis, one of the owners of the 
defendant, Linmar, when they flew over the location sometime prior 
to the meeting between Whicker and Smith in July 1983. (R.289) 
Defendant refused to vary therefrom notwithstanding strenuous 
objections from plaintiffs. Both parties agree that in that 
conversation plaintiffs told defendant that the proposed well and 
road "shattered his dreams," which were to subdivide the property 
for his retirement when he retired and returned to Utah. (R.616) 
In that meeting all parties also agreed that plaintiffs asked to 
have the well located on someone else's land or to provide access 
to the well in the southwest corner over the Wall property from 
the west (R.617) or to provide access to the well from the 
Altamont City street that abutted on the Taylor property to the 
east. (R.620) These requests were refused by Whicker, who 
asserted that the defendant would put the well where they chose 
and that Smith had no right or opportunity to modify. (R.619) 
Whicker1s other alleged reasons for refusing the alternate 
locations and alternate roadways were: first, he preferred to deal 
only with one landowner (R.187)f second, the Taylor property was 
"Indian land (R.618), which Whicker at trial acknowledged was not 
the fact even though he so represented to plaintiffs (R.222-4), 
third, that the Wall property was uniformly too wet to build an 
access road across although the distance would have been half that 
of the length of the road installed over plaintiffs1 property, 
(R.194) but when interrogated by the Court, Whicker reluctantly 
admitted that even over the wet Wall property, the actual cost of 
a road so constructed would be approximately equal to what 
defendant did in fact spend on the road so constructed on 
plaintiffs' property. (R.262-3) Whicker, himself, disqualified 
himself from being able to make any actual estimates for the cost 
of a road short of actually installing it in the following 
language: 
"A We never attempted to build that road. 
"Q So the answer is correct, right? 
"A Right. 
"Q You just abandoned that notion early on? 
"A Yes, we did. 
"Q Was your abandonment of that notion in part because 
the school asked you to abandon it? 
"A No. The abandonment was based on our experience 
that when you build in a wet location it costs you 
a great deal of money. 
"Q But you took no measurements to determine just what 
damage. 
MA The only measurement I know to take is to start 
building the roadr and we did not do that. 
it Q You can't know in advance of building a road what 
it's going to cost or what the expense is, what the 
depth of the water or the soil sample or any of 
those things that can be done? You don't do thatf 
that all happens after you commence the road? Is 
that what you are saying? 
WA I'm saying we don't do that, that's correct." 
(R.221) (Emphasis added.) 
Notwithstanding such a disclaimer as to his ability to 
estimate without actually commencing such road construction, he 
volunteered to estimate that constructing a road across 660 feet 
of the Wall property would cost "two to three times" what the 
actual road down the west side of the Smith property did in fact 
costs as follows: 
"Q How much more expensive to put the road across the 
Wall property? 
"A I would say two to three times what it cost. 
"Q Did you make any estimate? You are an engineer. 
Did you make an estimate? 
"A I'll make an estimate right now to two to three times. 
"Q Nof I want you to tell me what you didf Mr. Whicker. 
"A I looked at it and I said it's wet and consequently 
because it's wet that costs money and we don't want to 
built it there. 
"Q The whole nine acres of the Wall property is wet and 
we're not going to build. And you didn't bother to make 
any estimate as to what it would cost more. 
"A I didn't write down a formal list of it. No I didn't. 
"Q And your real reason was you prefer to deal with one 
rather than two owners, right? 
"A That's a reason, that's true. (R.194) 
Production began after the well had been completed in 
January 1984. Defendant commenced paying royalties to plaintiffs 
and the other mineral owners in that section in the month of 
February 1984, and they continued through March 1986. (Ex. 5; 
R.201-2) Plaintiffs have received nothing further from March 
1986 to the present time, either for oil or natural gas. (Ex. 4 & 
5; R.205, 628) In one of the four tanks constituting the battery 
on the well-site, defendant stored diesel fuel for the purpose of 
running the pumps, not only on the well-site, but other pumps on 
wells throughout the Altamont oil field (R.215), notwithstanding 
there is no such authority to store diesel fuel on the premises 
within the terms of the lease. (Ex. 12; R.279) 
It is necessary here to state that at the commencement 
of trial plaintiffs' counsel advised the Court and counsel that it 
was calling Mr. Curtis, not to be bound by his appraisal, but as 
evidence regarding the fair dealing, or lack thereof, on the part 
of defendant in trying to cause the least injury to the surface 
rights as mandated by the case of Flying Diamond v. Rust, 551 P2d 
509 (Utah 1976). The Court repeatedly disallowed Curtis's 
appraisal and testimony regarding defendant's offer to plaintiffs, 
notwithstanding such proposed evidence's direct bearing on the 
conduct of the parties. In that connection plaintiffs1 counsel 
also took exception to the fact that until four days before trial 
defendant had advised plaintiffs that it would use two appraisers, 
James Curtis and Howard R. Carroll. Then on the eve of trial, 
defendant advised that it would not use Curtis1s appraisal. 
(R.132) When it came time to tender Curtis1s testimony and to 
ask for his written appraisal, the Court sustained defendant's 
objection and allowed in only the comparable sales data, giving 
rise to Mr. Curtis's opinion, and refused any evidence either from 
that witness or subsequent witnesses as to any dealings with 
regard to defendant's actual offer to the plaintiffs on the 
supposed grounds that offers in settlement are not admissible. 
(R.302-8, 321, 592-7) Accordingly plaintiffs were prevented from 
fully developing their theory of the case. 
Some evidence about good faith dealings in considering 
alternate locations, both for the well-site and the? access road, 
was in fact introduced, together with some evidence about 
defendant's bad faith in negotiating. But because of the above-
noted rulings of the Court plaintiffs were in great measure 
neutralized in presenting evidence supporting their theory of the 
case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I . THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S 
FINDING NO. 5 THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CHOICE OF SAID WELL-SITE WAS 
REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL AND THAT DEALINGS OF DEFENDANT'S AGENT 
WITH PLAINTIFFS WERE CARRIED OUT IN GOOD FAITH. 
Flying Diamond v. Rust, supra, requires a balancing of 
interests between the rights of the surface owner and the mineral 
owner, and the mineral owner, in extracting oil from real 
property, must do so consistent with allowing the fee owner the 
greatest possible use of his property consistent therewith, even 
at additional expense to the mineral owner. 
In this case the defendant oil company violated its 
duties under Flying Diamond and refused to reasonably accommodate 
the surface owners in their desire to use the property for 
residential purposes, and accordingly under Flying Diamond is 
liable to plaintiffs for damages caused to plaintiffs1 property by 
the actions of the defendant. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS DAMAGES 
BASED ON THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE OF THE PROPERTY FOR RESIDENTIAL 
PURPOSES AND LIMITING RECOVERY TO ITS VALUE FOR AGRICULTURAL 
PURPOSES. 
The highest and best use of the plaintiffs1 property at 
the time that defendant entered the property was for residential 
purposes, although the property was then being used for 
agricultural purposes. The trial court determined as a legal 
matter that he was not permitted to award damages on the basis of 
an eminent domain theory, in other words for highest and best use, 
but rather was limited to awarding damages for agricultural 
purposes only. Plaintiffs argue that Flying Diamond stands for 
the proposition that the surface owner is entitled to compensation 
from the mineral owner for the fair market value of the property, 
which was an agricultural use, and accordingly in the instant case 
is entitled to the fair market value based upon the highest and 
best use of the plaintiffs1 property, which was for residential 
purposes. Although in Flying Diamond an additional ground for 
compensation was upheld, to-wit, the "growing crops" clause in the 
applicable lease, and although the instant case contains a similar 
clause and would likewise support damage to growing crops, the 
obligation in Flying Diamond was based upon balancing of interests 
between the owners of the surface and the minerals, and that duty 
applies whether the property is agricultural property or 
residential property. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFFS SEVERANCE DAMAGES. 
Flying Diamond, supra, stands for the proposition that 
if the mineral owner violates his duty to reasonably accommodate 
the surface owner in extracting minerals from the property, the 
owner of the mineral right is liable to the owner of the surface 
rights for severance damages. In the instant case plaintiffs 
argue that the defendant violated its duties under Flying Diamond, 
that the construction of the well-site and the road substantially 
diminished the rest of plaintiffs1 tract for development as a 
residential subdivision, and that accordingly defendant is liable 
for such severance damages. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE TRACT 
TAKEN HAD A POSSIBLE RESIDUAL VALUE OF $327 PER ACRE. 
The trial court found that the 4.76 acres taken by the 
defendant for the well-site and road were "unusable to plaintiffs 
for agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future and under the 
facts of the case the defendant can in fact hold on the property 
indefinitely." Plaintiffs therefore argue that when the Court 
reduced the award to the plaintiffs by a "possible" residual value 
which the Court found in the property thus taken in the amount of 
$375 per acre, the Court committed error. It is plaintiffs1 
position that the Court could not possible determine that the 
property being held by the defendants indefinitely into the future 
has any value to the plaintiffs, let alone a value of $375 per 
acre, particularly where plaintiffs have no current use whatsoever 
of the property in question, and may never have. 
POINT V. THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ARRIVING AT THE 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN BY ISOLATING ON TWO SALES 
AND THEN MAKING THE COURT'S OWN AJUSTMENT THERETO TO ARRIVE AT THE 
COURT'S OWN MARKET VALUE INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE FROM ANY OF THE 
OPINIONS OR EVIDENCE SUMMARIZED BY THE APPRAISERS. 
Plaintiffs argue here that the Court had a duty to 
consider all evidence on the question of fair market value and to 
make a determination of fair market value, but instead the Court 
isolated two comparable sales referred to by the expert witnesses, 
to which the Court made some adjustments as though the Court were 
the expert witness, and then in effect adopted its own 
"testimony," thus committing reversible error. 
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFFS PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
The trial courtf although awarding damages to the 
plaintiffs of $16,065f refused to award any interest to the 
plaintiffs between the time of the taking in 1983 and the time of 
the Court's decision in 1988. The Court based its refusal upon 
the ground that "damages cannot be measured as of a certain time 
or according to certain figures." Plaintiffs argued that the 
Court misinterpreted ruling case law in Utah, to-witf Bjork v. 
April Industries, Inc.f 560 P2d 315 (Utah 1977), and cases therein 
cited. Plaintiffs argue that under prevailing case law plaintiffs 
are entitled to interest, although the amount of dctmages is 
unliquidated, if the damages are complete as of a certain time and 
can be measured by some available standard. The daimages were 
complete as of the time of taking in 1983, and the standard is 
fair market value. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that the Court 
committed error in refusing to allow interest. Plaintiffs further 
argue that the interest rate of 10% should apply. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURTfS 
FINDING NO. 5 THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CHOICE OF SAID WELL-SITE WAS 
REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL AND THAT DEALINGS OF DEFENDANT'S AGENT 
WITH PLAINTIFFS WERE CARRIED OUT IN GOOD FAITH. 
The law which plaintiffs believe governs this case was 
set forth by the Supreme Court of Utah in 1976 in Flying Diamond 
v. Rust, supra. Flying Diamond was the oil- right lessee, and 
defendant Rust the surface owner. In that case the oil-right 
lessee took the position that its estate was dominant over the 
surface owner and that it had the right to make any use of the 
surface which it desired in extracting oil from the property. In 
furtherance thereof Flying Diamond refused the entreaties of the 
land owner as to the location of the road to the well-site and 
built the same in the location which was most advantageous (least 
expensive) to it without any regard to the uses the surface owner 
desired to make of his property. The Supreme Court held that the 
Flying Diamond had a right to use the surface to the extent 
"reasonably necessary" to extract oil, but the court stated that 
this right is limited in that the mineral owner may exercise it 
only as "reasonably necessary" and that such use must be 
"consistent with allowing the fee owner the greatest possible use 
of his property consistent therewith." The court further stated 
that the mineral owner and the surface owner "each should have the 
right to the use and enjoyment of his interest in the property to 
the highest degree possible not inconsistent with the rights of 
the other." The court then went on to say that the lessee was not 
obliged to use "any possible alternative," but was obliged to use 
one which is "reasonable and practical under the circumstances" 
even though it cost him more than another alternative. The 
Supreme Court of Utah then held that the lower court was justified 
in finding that Flying Diamond had abused its obligations under 
the foregoing standard, and was accordingly responsible to the 
land owner for damages for the taking of the well-site and road 
and for the damages to an additional 15 acres upon which the 
irrigation had been impaired by virtue of the unreasonable 
location of the road. 
Thusf in Flying Diamond the court clearly set out that 
the use made of the surface by the mineral owner must involve a 
balancing of interests between the surface owner and the mineral 
owner. In other words, the mineral owner is not entitled to the 
use of the surface in any manner just because it is cheapest to 
him when the damage to the surface owner will be substantial. The 
mineral owner is in other words required to incur additional 
expense where a balancing of interests requires that expenditure. 
This imposes on the parties a burden to deal fairly with one 
another and involves a good faith give and take. It is then for 
the court to determine, in the event of a dispute, where the 
proper balance is to be achieved in a given case. 
It is plaintiffs' position that from the very beginning 
defendant failed to enter into any kind of reasonable negotiation 
with the plaintiffs as to the location of the well-site or road. 
Defendant came to the plaintiffs in the first place and told 
plaintiffs where defendant was going to place the road, and told 
plaintiffs that plaintiffs had no right to any input in that 
matter. We believe that all reasonable minds must agree that such 
conduct does not constitute good faith dealing and does not meet 
the standard established in Flying Diamond v. Rust. Accordingly, 
the trial court committed manifest error in so finding in its 
Finding No. 5f and the decision of the lower court must for that 
reason be reversed. 
Bad faith in bargaining was clearly evident in the 
testimony of defendant's agent, Whicker, and the plaintiffs 
regarding their discussions about location of the well-site. 
Plaintiffs categorically stated that they were given no choice or 
opportunity to have any imput as to the location of the well-site 
elsewhere on their property. Mr. Whicker conceded that he did not 
give Mr. Smith such a well-site option, but asserted four years 
later that he was willing to install the access road down the east 
and along the south border of the subject property, but never so 
stated before trial. Smith in turn denied any offered variance 
being made, and moreover his suggestions to locate the well and/or 
access road on neighboring land were also refused. Whicker 
corroborates that testimony as noted in the Statement of Facts 
above. Whicker, however, did in one candid moment admit that the 
site for the well had been picked in a fly-over of the subject 
property some several months before his first conversation with 
the plaintiffs when he (Whicker) and his boss then and there 
determined the location of the well-site. When the Court 
specifically interrogated Whicker as to whether there were 
topographical or geological reasons for locating the well-site on 
the actual 4.76 acres that were takenf his answer was a waffle, 
but he said in effect that they were concerned only about getting 
as close to an alleged producing well in the section to the south 
and west. He made no other geological or topographical 
indications. Then in cross-examination with regard to locating 
the well off the subject property Whicker went to some length to 
point out the supposed swampy conditions on both the Leonard Wall 
and the school district propertyf but then again, when being 
interrogated by the Court directlyf admitted that bringing a road 
in across the Leonard Wall property, half the distance to the 
subject parcel, would have costf even across the swampf no more 
than the road coming down as it does now from the county road to 
the north end of the subject. This good-faith in dealing issue is 
relevent because it places the defendant in the same shoes as 
Flying Diamond in the Rust case. That is, defendant elected where 
it would put its well-site and did so without modifying or moving 
or changing location to help the plaintiffs or to make such a 
location less burdensome on the plaintiffs' planned use of the 
property. 
It would not appear to be a defense, available to 
defendant, that plaintiffs did not specifically ask for a 
different location for the road and well-site on the 20-acre 
tract, when the defendant mislead the plaintiffs by telling them 
that defendant had the right to put the road and well-site 
anywhere defendant wanted. We believe that the mineral owner in 
the light of Flying Diamond v. Rust had an affirmative duty to 
openly and fairly negotiate and deal in good faith with the 
surface owner, to the end that his rights were protected. We 
believe this is a duty not unlike that of a fiduciary. In any 
event, it is clear that the mineral owner cannot affirmatively 
mislead the uninformed surface owner by telling him he has no 
right to any input in the determination of a reasonable location. 
From all the evidence, we believe the Court can and must 
conclude that the locating of that well-site was a fixed and 
accomplished fact prior to any conversations between Whicker and 
the plaintiffs. The matter is most directly highlighted by the 
proximate final exchange between the parties wherein Mr. Smith 
refused to accept Whicker's offer and was asked by Whicker if he 
intended to be there with a shotgun to keep defendant off the 
property, and the plaintiff's answer was, "No, but I will see you 
in court." Then Whickerfs prophecy was made about delay and 
economic punishment. 
Even Whicker admitted that there was nothing topographi-
cally wrong about locating the well-site in the southeast corner 
of the subject property where plaintiffs wanted it, only that it 
would be further away from the producing well to the south. 
Moreover, he rejected the notion of putting the well on the Taylor 
parcel just to the east for that reason (and because it was Indian 
land) and out of hand rejected the notion of providing access to a 
well-site on the southeast of the subject or on the Taylor 
property by using the existing city street that abuts the Taylor 
property, claiming that there were children playing on the street, 
whereas there are numerous children on the county road from which 
access to the well-site is now served. He implied as well that 
some permission would be needed from Altamont City, but there was 
no evidence submitted by the defendant that any such access would 
in any way be interferred with by Altamont City or that Altamont 
could so interfere. (R.262, 276-7) 
By contrast, the plaintiff and Mr. Palmer both agreed 
that the subject parcel would be far less impacted had the well-
site been placed in the southeast corner with the access road 
running down the east side. It would be impacted even less if the 
subject well were drilled in the southeast corner and access 
permitted from the city street across the Taylor property. 
Whicker's only objection to that was that it would require dealing 
"with two landowners." As noted above, Whicker earlier admitted 
that he may have said to plaintiffs that the Taylor property was 
"Indian ground," and they didn't like dealing with the Indians. 
At trial Whicker admitted it was not Indian land. (R.222-224) 
This lack of good faith in dealing with the surface 
owner is also demonstrated in dealings between the parties after 
defendant entered the property. Plaintiff himself testified that 
he made good faith efforts to negotiate a settlement in this 
matter, only to be met with complete disdain from Mr. Whicker. 
(R.626) That is, Mr. Whicker "promised" him that unless the 
offer as extended was takenr the defendant would purposely cause 
delay and predicted that the price ultimately awarded to plaintiff 
herein would be less than that figure offered by Whicker. The 
plaintiff then said candidly that Whicker's prophecy was halfway 
correct, that he certainly has thus far delayed them. That 
testimony was not denied by Whicker. In fact he said he didn't 
actually remember so stating, but said he might very well have so 
stated. The specific testimony of Mr. Smith is as follows: 
"Q . . . When was the next such conversation that you can 
recall? 
"A I don't remember every one the exact time, but I do 
remember just prior to them moving the rig on my 
property he did call me and wanted to know if I would 
accept the offer, and I told him no. He strongly 
encouraged me to accept that offer, and I still wouldn't 
do it. I said, 'I do not want you on my property.1 
And he said at that time, 'Are you going to come out 
with a shotgun and stand at the gate and keep me from 
your property?' 
I said, 'No. If you come on my property I'll see you 
in court.' 
"Q What was his response to that? 
"A He indicated to me that that would not be a wise choice, 
that if we took this to court that it would be drug out 
through a number of years, it would cost me much money 
and legal fees, and in the long run I would still 
receive less money. He has been partially right in 
dragging it out and the legal fees. I'm hoping he is 
not partially right in the other part. 
"Q Did he ever at either of those conversations make any 
reference to who had the right to put the well site 
where — 
"A In my opinion — 
Mr. Adkins: Objection. 
"Q (By Mr. Madsen) I don't want your opinion. Did he say 
anything to you that would suggest who had the right to 
put the well site there? 
"A Yes. Because of the oil lease that my mother had signed 
he had the right to enter my property and put an oil rig 
anywhere that he desired. 
WQ Did he suggest to you that you had any say there in that 
matter? 
"A I was not aware of any such privileges." (R.627-8) 
When Whicker was asked about the same conversations the 
questions and responses were as follows: 
MQ Now, then, calling your attention to the last two things 
that you said to Mr. Smith in that final conversation 
when he told you he wasn't willing to take your offer 
and that he would see you in court, do you recall 
telling him that that was an unfortunate decision 
because, first, you could delay it, and second, because 
he would wind up receiving less than you had last 
offered to pay him? Do you remeber that conversation? 
"A No. I do not. 
WQ Do you deny that it happened? 
WA I have no record of it. I have no way to deny it or 
substantiate it. 
WQ You have no recollection? You're saying you don't 
remember it, not that it didn't happen; is that correct? 
WA I frankly don't believe I would say that, but I have no 
recollection." (R.225-6) 
This same course of dealings is obvious from the fact 
that, having gotten an appraisal from Mr. Curtis, defendant (only 
a matter of days before trial) notified counsel for plaintiffs 
that defendant refused to use Mr. Curtis, and instead put on Mr. 
Carrollf who used the Curtis comparable material and came in at an 
appraisal one-half of that given by Mr. Curtis. It is almost as 
though defendant said to plaintiffs that "since you wouldn't take 
our offer, we will now punish you by finding an appraiser willing 
to come in at one-half the figure we have been offering these last 
four years." It not only impeaches Mr. Carroll to use the same 
comparable material and come in four years later with a figure 50% 
below, but it shows as well a calculated effort on the part of 
defendant to fulfill the other half of Mr. Whicker1s prophecy, and 
clearly demonstrates bad faith and a clear violation of lessee's 
duties under Flying Diamond. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS DAMAGES 
BASED ON THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE OF THE PROPERTY FOR RESIDENTIAL 
PURPOSES AND LIMITING RECOVERY TO ITS VALUE FOR AGRICULTURAL 
PURPOSES. 
Regarding highest and best use, Mr. Richard Palmer (on 
behalf of plaintiffs), whose qualifications were stipulated to 
(R.347) (unlike Mr. Carroll's), testified that not only utilizing 
the Curtis comparables, but other sales he examined in the County 
Recorder's office (R.360) and in Mr. Snow's office and in other 
real estate offices and in discussions with appraisers, people in 
Altamont City government (R.350-51) and in Duchesne County 
government (R.356), and utilizing his experience in having given 
appraisals, all over the state (but in particular in the Uintah 
Basin) (R.348) and reasonably close to this same time period in 
1982 and 1983, he concluded that the Curtis comparables were 
directly related (R.360-61) and that the other sales were not 
nearly so related or comparable. He then determined that the four 
sales of the one parcel referred to by Mr. Carroll were of no use 
in arriving at value for the subject property. (R.489-90) He 
corroborated Mr. Curtis1s approach that small parcels sell for 
more per acre than large parcels, and hence the 4.76 acres was to 
be compared with other parcels of the same or approximately the 
same size, and that the total acreage should be compared to larger 
parcel sales in the vicinity. (R.369-71) He then indicated (as 
Mr. Curtis had to some extent done) that he made extensive 
investigation about the possibilities of annexing the subject 
property to Altamont City or subdividing in Duchesne County, 
moratorium notwithstanding. Altamont was welcoming annexations 
and participating in payment of part or all of the utilities 
installation costs. (R.350-54) He concluded that the highest and 
best use, particularly in view of the fact of the close proximity 
and availability of all utilities, was for subdivision purposes 
and not for agricultural use. (R.354) It is significant that Mr. 
Curtis came to the same conclusion, but discounted or disregarded 
it purely because of the moratorium without doing any further 
investigation along those lines and also because he claimed no 
expertise in fixing severance damages. (R.310-11, 318-20) 
Defendant's last-minute appraiser, Howard R. Carroll, 
destroyed his own credibility in several particulars. First, his 
very appraisal, admitted over objection (R.407), and all of the 
language therein, treated developments in Duchesne County 
following the acquisition date, all of which is precluded from the 
normal appraisal because it has to be couched in language of what 
a willing buyer will pay at that time, being informed of all of 
the available uses of the property and of all of the factors 
influencing value, in short, being fully informed at that time. 
The willing buyer is not permitted to be blessed with 20/20 
hindsight, and Mr. Carroll's hindsight permeates and destroys his 
appraisal. (R.380, 391, 393-407) 
Mr. Carroll asserted that there was no severance damage, 
and that was because he took the view that the highest and best 
use was agricultural and that the property could still be used for 
agriculture, and that there had been no impact upon the 
agricultural use by virtue of the well-site and road. (R.404-5) 
Plaintiffs submit that such an argument, along with the 
rest of Mr. Carroll's testimony, is incredible and not entitled to 
credence, both because of his admitted reliance on hindsight and 
because of his groundless unwillingness to even consider the 
subject property as being developable as subdivision property as 
of August 1983. Since he refused to consider that possibility, he 
is hardly a competent witness as to what severance damages would 
have flowed from such a determination of highest and best use. 
It is significant that Mr. Curtis (whose appraisal was 
done at the time of the taking) and Mr. Palmer each considered 
residential development, and that Mr. Palmer, upon doing a 
thorough analysis, determined that such a possiblity was indeed 
not only possible, but likely, and that a willing, uncompelled 
buyer would consider that use in determining the amount such buyer 
would pay for the property. 
As noted above, in Flying Diamond v. Rust, the court 
held that since the owner of the mineral interest had failed to 
utilize a reasonable alternative, he was liable for destruction of 
the well-site and road and also for the partial destruction of an 
additional 15 acres. 
Although the court talks in terms of failure of the 
mineral owner to use a "reasonable alternative," it appears that 
that test is directed more at the partial destruction to the 15 
acres than to the total destruction of the well-site and road 
because, even if Flying Diamond had selected the reasonable 
alternative, the well-site and road would presumably have been 
installed, and yet the court in that case did not for that reason 
decline to compensate the land owner for the taking of the road 
and well-site. 
In other words, although the Supreme Court talks in 
terms of reasonable alternatives, it appears that the court in 
effect held that where the extraction of minerals requires a 
substantially complete taking of part of the surface, the surface 
owner is entitled to compensation therefor, irrespective of good 
faith or balancing of interests. In so holding, we believe that 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that, although there may have been 
justification for allowing the mineral owner to destroy the 
surface in times past when land was cheap, society has left that 
era and the courts must acknowledge the legitimate interests of 
surface owners, and that compensation be paid to the surface owner 
where the extraction of minerals destroys the surface. 
It should be noted that in the Flying Diamond case, 
Flying Diamond was not given a "credit" for not using the road it 
presumably could have used, but didn't. 
Defendant's bad faith brings this case squarely within 
Flying Diamond, but even if that were not so, plaintiffs believe, 
and would urge this court to adopt the view, that where the 
mineral owner destroys the surface, he must pay the surface owner 
the reasonable value thereof for the highest and best use of the 
surface, whether for agricultural purposes, for residential 
purposes, or whatever the highest and best use may be. 
We believe that another aspect of the Flying Diamond 
case supports the foregoing. In that case the court determined as 
an additional basis for sustaining the lower court that the 
mineral lease provided that the owner of the mineral interest was 
required to pay the surface owner for damage to "growing crops." 
The court held that "growing crops" included "any useful product 
of land whether sown or occurring naturally." The discussion of 
crops in Flying Diamond occurred after the court determined that 
Flying Diamond was liable for the taking of the well-site and 
roadf and the ruling with regard to crops was thus an additional 
ground in support of the ruling of the lower court. In Flying 
Diamond the highest and best use of the land in question was 
agricultural, and therefore the discussion with regard to crops 
could be given a literal interpretation. We believe, however, 
that the discussion of the court was not intended to be so limited 
and that in effect the court in its discussion of growing crops is 
setting forth in another form the principle that the mineral owner 
is required to compensate the surface owner for any substantially 
total taking of surface rights, whether the land be agricultural 
or otherwise, and that the measure of compensation to be paid is 
the fair market value of the land for whatever its highest and 
best use may be. 
It is plaintiffs' position that the Flying Diamond case 
established the principle that the owner of the mineral estate is 
liable for the area of the surface taken for well cind road where 
that use amounts to substantially a total taking of the property 
and that the damages recoverable by the owner of the surface right 
are based upon the highest and best use of the tract. In the 
Flying Diamond case the highest and best use of the property taken 
was for agricultural purposes, but in the instant case the highest 
and best use of the property taken by the defendant was for 
residential purposes, and under the authority of Flying Diamond 
plaintiffs were entitled to be awarded damages based on the value 
of the property for residential purposes. 
It is submitted that the evidence requires a finding 
that the highest and best use was for residential purposesf but 
even if the fact finder were free to choose betweem residential 
purposes and agricultural purposes, the lower court in effect 
ruled as a matter of law that it could not consider highest and 
best use, but only the agricultural use to which the property was 
being used at the time of the taking. (See Findings of Fact No. 4 
and No. 12.) Had the Court felt that it could use the "theory of 
eminent domain," in other words highest and best use, it very 
likely would have found that the highest and best use was for 
residential purposes. This appears to be borne out by the fact 
that the Court in Finding of Fact No. 8 speaks of proximity to 
Altamont as enhancing the value of this tract, and that 
consideration is far more applicable to residential property than 
to agricultural land. Being near to Altamont does not enhance the 
crop any, but makes a big difference for residential purposes. 
The Court in the Flying Diamond case, in adopting its 
balancing of interests doctrine, which is not dependent on 
contract, was in effect acknowledging the same policy that has 
been enacted into law by our legislature in the realm of eminent 
domain. See Section 78-34-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
"In all cases where land is required for public 
use, the person, or his agent, in charge of such use may 
survey and locate the same; but it must be located in 
the manner which will be most compatible with the 
greatest public good and the least private injury, ... " 
(Emphasis added.) 
We note also in passing that use of the power of eminent 
domain is available to oil companies in the course of developing 
their mineral interests, and that indeed Mr. Whicker threatened 
the use of condemnation in this case if Mr. Smith were unwilling 
to allow them on his land to put in their well site. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFFS SEVERANCE DAMAGES. 
What Flying Diamond v. Rust stands for, we think, is 
that when the lessee of the mineral interest is reasonable in his 
use of the surface and takes reasonable steps to accommodate the 
surface owner, then he must compensate the surface owner for 
direct damage done to land. If, however, the mineral owner does 
not reasonably accommodate the surface owner, then he is liable 
not only for such direct damage, but in addition for all damages 
which flow from his conduct, including the area taken and areas 
suffering consequential or severance damage. 
We urge this Court to adopt the rationale of the 
Memorandum Decision in Flying Diamond v. Rust (Exhibit 23) wherein 
Judge Bullock said in the final sentence of paragraph 4: 
"The use of the land taken by the plaintiff for the 
well-site and the road is effectively and permanently 
denied to the surface owner for any use theretofore made 
of the land, and the Court holds that such damage is the 
fair market value of the land at the time it was taken . 
it 
* . 
In the Flying Diamond v. Rust case the last paragraph, 
alludes to the case of Frankfort Oil Co. v. Abrams, 159 Colorado 
535, 413 P2d 190 (1966). The Frankfort case appears to hold that 
mere depreciation to the surviving or remaining land of the 
surface-owner was not compensable, but only the land actually 
taken. In his opinion, concurring in result, but otherwise 
dissenting, Justice Frantz puts the whole matter succinctly this 
way: 
"Although I concur in the result reached by the 
majority, I would confine the holding of the case to its 
particular fact. 
"The main question presented on this writ is 
whether or not depreciation to surrounding land caused 
simply by the presence of well-head or a similar 
installation is compensable under paragraph 11 of the 
Colorado Oil & Gas Lease operative in this case. I 
agree it is not, but would go no further than that. 
"The court goes far beyond this with his language. 
It holds 'that land damages are limited to the surface 
used by Frankfurt only . . . ' (emphasis supplied), 
never defining what is meant by the term 'used1 other 
than to later refer to the 'operations specified' and 
the 'actual authorized operations on the land.' 
"'Use1 is a relative term. The majority claims it 
has so used it, but this is too subtle a reading of its 
remark for me to comprehend. It should specifically be 
understood by those who would look to this case as 
authority that it in fact holds only that mere presence 
on part of leased land is not necessarily a use of the 
remainder. Other 'operations,' as that term appears in 
the lease, could be a partial taking and, therefore, a 
compensable use." 
The dissenting opinion thus urges the need for a 
thorough and thoughtful analysis of the term "use" in the light of 
the facts of the given case. When Justice Crockett in Flying 
Diamond says that, "We see no reason to disagree with the holding 
of the Frankfort case," he is not simply saying that severance 
damages are not proper as to cases where the mineral owner has not 
acted in good faith—he is saying just the reverse. 
In fact, it appears that our court reaches the same 
result urged by the dissent in Frankfort, by a slightly different 
route. Our Court seeks to solve the problem by requiring a 
balancing of interest, and the dissent in Frankfort would perhaps 
solve it by a broad interpretation of the idea of '"use." In any 
event, the oil company abused its responsibility in Flying Diamond 
as it did in this case, and Justice Crockett's analysis applies: 
"Our interest is in the essential fact as to what 
was done. When viewed in that light, it is apparent 
that the trial court found that because of the placement 
and manner of construction of the plaintiff road, 
preventing irrigation of 15 acres of the defendant's 
land, its usefulness and value were diminished to the 
extent of $750 per acre. Applying the standard rule of 
indulging the presumptions of verity to the findings and 
judgment of the trial court, we are not persuaded that 
they should be disturbed." (Emphasis added.) 
Had defendant in this instance placed the well in the 
southeast corner of the plaintiffs' property and provided access 
through the existing road and across the Taylor parcel, for 
example, it would have been done with the least private injury and 
whatever resulting damages the remaining property sustained might 
have been noncompensable. Here, however, because defendant 
arbitrarily placed the road and well-site where it did, it didn't 
result in the least injury of the surface owner, but rather the 
most, and defendant thereby becomes liable just as in Flying 
Diamond v. Rust, and our Supreme Court there held that the 
diminution in value of the 15 acres so affected by the placement 
of the Flying Diamond road was upheld as compensable damages. 
Here, by placing the road down the west side and establishing the 
well-site in the southwest corner, the remaining parcel of 15.24 
acres has been damaged, and said damage, by virtue of defendant's 
arbitrary placement, is compensable. 
Palmer testified that the before value was $2,500 per 
acre and that the remaining 15.24-acre parcel suffered a 25% 
diminution in value by virtue of the taking of the 4.76 acres, as 
it was and where it was, destroyed or seriously impeded 
subdividing as a possibility and that, while it may still be 
subdividable, there would have to be that kind of diminution in 
the price in order to attract buyers had the property been 
subdivided the day after the well-site had been installed. Palmer 
further testified, as did plaintiff, that had the well-site been 
located in the southeast corner with the road running down the 
east property line, the impact would have been far less. 
Plaintiff added that he would have then been able to subdivide in 
connection with his uncle and cousin, a viable possibility which 
had only been discussed prior to the coming of the well-site, but 
is now precluded by its existence. 
Thus, we submit Flying Diamond v. Rust stands for the 
proposition that the surface owner is entitled to compensation for 
the land taken for wellsite and road under the general principles 
governing the rights between the owner of the surface and the 
mineral estate, also on the strength of the crop clause in the 
lease. The case as there noted also stands for the proposition 
that where the owner of the mineral interest does not reasonably 
accommodate the surface owner, then he is liable—not only for the 
land taken for road and wellsite—but for all damages which flow 
from his conduct, including the area taken and areas suffering 
consequential or severance damage, and the measure of damages in 
determining severance damages, as well as the damage for the land 
actually taken, is the highest and best use as noted under Point 
II. 
In its Findings the Court excluded any consideration of 
severance damages as to reasonable uses by limiting his 
consideration to agricultural use only, and in so ruling committed 
reversible error. The record contained ample testimony to support 
severance damages, which the Court obviously did not consider, and 
the lower court's ruling on severance damages should be reversed 
and the matter remanded for the Court to make findings as to the 
amount of severance damages. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE TRACT 
TAKEN HAD A POSSIBLE RESIDUAL VALUE OF $327 PER ACRE. 
In its Finding of Fact No. 8 the Court stated, among 
other things: 
"The court further finds that the property has some 
possible residual value to plaintiffs (hereinafter 
referred to as "residual value"), which the court finds 
to be $375 per acre." 
The Court further found in paragraph 6 of its Findings 
with respect to the property taken that: 
"The said use to which defendant has put the well-
site is of such nature and duration that it is rendered 
unusable to plaintiffs for agricultural purposes in the 
foreseeable future, and such damage to growing crops and 
to said land for agricultural purposes amounts to 
virtually a total taking of the property by defendant, 
and the court finds that the value of such taking by 
defendant can most accurately be measured by determining 
the fair market value of the well-site and deducting any 
residual value to the owner after defendant's use has 
ended and the property restored." 
It is respectfully submitted that these two findings are 
inconsistent. In paragraph 6 the Court determines that there has 
been an absolute taking of the property and inasmuch as it is 
unusable for the "foreseeable future." How the Court can 
determine that it has any residual value to the plaintiffs, let 
alone $375, when the defendant alone will use the property for the 
"foreseeable future" is difficult to imagine. 
Plaintiffs cannot use the 4.76 acres for agricultural or 
other purposes and will not be able to use it until it is 
relinquished by the defendant. Defendant can hold on to the 
property indefinitely. We believe that the Court has erred in 
finding any residual value because the period of time which 
plaintiffs will be deprived of the property is perpetual, and 
furthermore the plaintiffs are being deprived of all use of that 
land during that period of time. In other words, it might be 
proper to determine a residual value if the plaintiffs were 
presently being able to make some use of the land. In the Flying 
Diamond case the Court determined that the surface owner's land by 
reason of interference with his irrigation system did not result 
in a total taking, but only in a diminished value to the land. It 
must, however, be remembered that in the Flying Diamond case the 
landowner still was able to use the land, although his use was 
substantially diminished. In the instant case the landowner 
cannot use the property taken to the extent of $375 per acre, or 
any other amount, in the foreseeable future. For all the Court is 
able to determine when that property is returned to the landowner, 
if ever, it won't be worth anything. 
We respectfully submit that the Court, under the facts 
of this case, is compelled to find that the destruction of the 
land taken was total. 
Furthermore, it is not proper for the Court to deduct 
$375 per acre from the value of the property taken on the basis 
that it has a "possible" residual value. Unless the Court can 
determine that it has a "probable" residual value, the Court must 
find that the destruction to the land was complete and total. 
POINT V. THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ARRIVING AT THE 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN BY ISOLATING ON TWO SALES 
AND THEN MAKING THE COURT'S OWN AJUSTMENT THERETO TO ARRIVE AT THE 
COURT'S OWN MARKET VALUE INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE FROM ANY OF THE 
OPINIONS OR EVIDENCE SUMMARIZED BY THE APPRAISERS. 
Paragraph 6 of the Court's Ruling reads as follows: 
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generally, and the following two instructions have to do with 
experts using comparable sales, and as the court can readily 
observe, use of specific comparable sales as referred to in each 
of those instructions may be used "only for the purpose of 
determining what weight, if any, you accorded to the testimony of 
any of the expert witnesses in his ultimate opinion as to the fair 
market value of the land in question." (Emphasis added) Or "such 
sales form a basis for the opinion regarding value of the witness 
relying thereon, but such sales, though reasonably comparable, are 
not to be considered as the sole test of fair market value 
herein." (Emphasis added.) 
In short, had a jury returned with a verdict form on 
which it had written the same wording as appears in paragraph 6 of 
the Court's Ruling, the jury would have committed reversible error 
and would have in fact failed to follow the Court's instructions. 
It is patently clear, therefore, that the judge as fact finder 
cannot do what a jury would be precluded from doing. To isolate 
two sales and then apply the Court's own adjustments thereon to 
arrive at an opinion as to the market value of the subject 
property is to convert the fact finder (the judge in this 
instance) into being the expert witness—the sole expert witness-
-in total disregard of all the other relevant evidence. Such 
conduct by the Court herein is therefore patent error. 
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFFS PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
P l a i n t i f f s c i t ^ B j o r k v . A p r i l I n d u s t r i e s , I n c , - ~^ 
3 1 ^ • ' • t s - a " ' : * ' • - , 
i -J . .,-.i ; . • . » : T . n T . I s a c t i c * Bjork 
t h e vaor—TV: J -•;:•'* ^r ' J t a n --^- fc-*th i" o a o e 3 1" i nummary -^ r.iie 
law - : •?*- -> judqmer+~ i n t e r e s t _ i d 
s . i r e f e r s t o t :v . o . , ..,* ,^ * ->e < ii: \-ise.c*: J a c k 
B. P a r s o n C o n s t r u c t i o n v . S t a t e o f Utah y 552 , * - * , 
U i n t a _Pip-f ^HL„ '\. _ * 1_„ ^;„-,: „ , ^ -:J_- ) f 
J * .- ^ L. \ . i n i o n P a c i f i c , 
The s^.a^enit ~t o ' -n*1 C~ur* :n B j o r k a p p e a r s * an 
:. r ; \ i ;*: * *< Nummary" v- mur" i ' f < i *"iose 
d e c i - i ' ^ r * F e l l .* : *h*-re d e f e n d a n t d e l a y e r 
3 n e ^ JJ. 2C <i id i , . i • >;se *• '31 -^Kv ;ed 
su r t e r e d v;----v~ -,, — • J '"he V> • * ^h^re s t a g e d *" ,-\a ~"> 
fa-*t t h a t d imaa^s ar-^ . : . .,, _ n^t / ier 
h - . - - - '* ros* p r o p e r ,. n .. -- - o u r t o o i n t s -v * - ^ a t 
t n e t e s t i s : a r e tn<- d a m a g e s c o m p l e t e a s of a c e r t a i n ~ - TV = a~-i 
j a r -ne d a m a g e s '^ "- ^ s i - « ,-t , s 
•* , - * . > _ . . o. , - example, ar-r not 
fixec •• , \- .) M e i r nature they extend ir.ic -or - " M ^ K O . 
Also - — Wov-,-s , . , 
--•*-* • •* . . A/^ r . in . :d a:. . wri** is not . : >> 
o^ur* .-i i i_ held t- •* **- damage - :: property is fixed in time and 
also there is a known standard of value available to the fact 
finder, and therefore prejudgment interest should be awarded. The 
court said at page 111: 
"The true test to be applied as to whether interest 
should be allowed before judgment in a given case or not 
is, therefore, not whether the damages are unliquidated 
or otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent 
damages are complete and must be ascertained as of a 
particular time and in accordance with fixed rules of 
evidence and known standards of value, which the court 
or jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather than be 
guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to 
be allowed for past as well as for future injury, or for 
elements that cannot be measured by any fixed standards 
of value. The same rule under the same conditions would 
of necessity apply to actions for breach of contract." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the Uinta case the court quoted at length from the 
Fell case and ruled: 
"There can be no question about the propriety of 
allowing interest for the destruction of personal 
property prior to judgment where value can be measured 
by facts and figures." 
It is evident then that "facts and figures" are the 
equivalent of "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of 
value." 
The Uinta case refers to Railroad v. Board of 
Education, 35 Ut 13, 99 P 263 (1909), where the court held that 
interest was appropriate in a condemnation case, and this prior to 
enactment of the statute allowing interest in condemnation cases. 
The court there held that interest was allowable whether the 
condemnation was viewed as a total taking or merely one involving 
a diminution in value, and the court pointed out that interest is 
allowable if the damages are ascertain •" " iccordance with some 
definite -~^r<iUr* *- opposed *— v -. - *" case *.--* 
f • JL •-. "he cou t seated at 
page 24: • • 
"We, therefore, have a case in which, for the 
purpose of fixing damages, the injury is complete; 
the damages are ascertained by the ordinary rules of 
evidence and according to a known standard or measure 
of value. And all of this must be determined from;. 
competent evidence, which is binding upon both the 
court and jury. The jury, therefore, only had a right 
to exercise their judgment within the 1 imits of the 
evidence upon the question of value. It is not a case 
where it was left to the jury to determine the amount 
of damages from a mere description of the wrong s done 
or injuries inflicted whether to person,- property or 
reputation." 
-arson v. State of Utah the court held 
^hat damages, although unliquidated, were ascertainable by 
calculate~ v * • 4-her°f^,r'v prejudgment inter 
damages ™& .U_A, .C ^ , :~ 
^his case i:-t . v : in. i quidated , * -vertneless fixed a - i 
certain t
 t v.* -i -, ^ =^ ,->^ +'=» * -*-*•-' ^ *- arcr^ian ^  
_r : :re preijdqm- at 
iatar j st s u5.t. . • -t jva rc:pc! ?c pi 3: n*" . ' : 
<\. ~ ; respect ^ *• r e ^ ^ ^+-<^VQ^- < ^* 
"r.cV. m e c^1 ? \: a::er tn^ .uteres': 
statute, Sect:.- . r -in Ocd** Arr:otat.->d , %:- rnanged raising 
the legal ; nterest rate from the os iat^ to m e r- I i - : 
10% per an;- . 
It is axiomatic thatf to the extent that the damages are 
based upon the principle announced in Flying Diamond v. Rust 
relating to unreasonable use of the surface by the mineral owner 
that interest would be at the rate prevailing by .statute at the 
time of the wrong, which would be the 10% per annum rate. The 
District Court in Flying Diamond allowed the then-prevailing legal 
rate of 6% per annum, and that was affirmed on appeal. 
Does a different result follow if damages are based upon 
the lease and therefore on a contract theory? It would not appear 
that it does. In the lower court defendant cited the case of SCM 
Land v. Watkins, 732 P2d 1051 (Utah 1986)f for the proposition 
that damages in this case arise out of a contract which was 
executed at a time when the interest rate was 6% and that that 
rate prevails although the rate was changed by statute in the 
interim. The case does not stand for that proposition. In SCM 
the lease in question was executed July 9, 1979, almost two years 
prior to the change in the statutory interest rate, and it must be 
noted that the lease there was breached in April 1981, prior to 
the effective date of the rate change, which was May 1981. Where 
the breach occurred prior to the effective date of the rate 
change, there can be no question that the interest rate prevailing 
at the time of the breach (6% in SCM) would be the proper rate of 
interest, and anything stated in SCM in excess of that is purely 
dicta and was not necessary to the decision in that case. 
It seems apparent* that wnat * he . gislature .it^ndf^ „. 
th^ ^rr-^.* -~ ictment of ^r^ion 15-- * * 3 
t : ratp o: .;.:e,jst. wai J . tended 
to apply **,. -". ror^rao* • nen exis":r,c *- hat had a crovisi-;-; . 
spelling 1 ^ ^ r o ^ rate or v __ seme. -~ _ * J v , * > ^ 
terms to .- statutory interest rate then prevailing. '. *•  gnore 
any such language * i 'ij^ny s - 2 - e- »r. ;accn--- . - J-.I o* -a I 
impairment of ,J '•*"'••*, i,owevei 
bpfou" I.hi I lie-.1 Lease makes no rei^K ^: • * •.^res: at 
all, the statutory interest rate prevailing ^ the tin- 02 oreach 
would apply, 
. ^ n*- as +-~ interest, the 
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*-h^  -i-at-'.- * "* * - *v' r •*-actual mar ~ 
.••re was ^ - .J ^I ,e leas-, rhere 
was .iteres*- cnarqe" rna- "applies" t< * e ootrrar1". -nly 
af^e" :r^i' -h^1"? damage . . 
" T I W . 
d e f e n d a r / - ^ La^nt 1." ^ a-- w r i a o r o m i s s o r y " o t e — e v e n t ^ i o ^ r 
t h e r e were, no^ y e t "^  o r ° a c ^ - ~ , " ^ u 1 e s a i a tn \ 
herr _0_^  *'e - i t e r e s t . - n a r g e of fc* ;, ui a o p l i e d b e f o r e t r -
s t a t u * " ? cT^rivi* 1 , i - ^  ^ Q f o r p ,
 rt ^ ? ^  ~ — j — 3 - j _ 
• • -~ ^ j j j a . r a t o t : i t=;i
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is the proper rate to be applied. 
Where the interest rate changes between execution of the 
contract and breach, and the interest rate is imposed by statute 
and not by contract, the later rate applies. In Goodfriend v. 
Druck, 289 So. 2d 710 (Florida 1974)f a promissory note executed 
in 1962 called for 10% per annum interest before maturity and 15% 
per annum thereafter. At issue was the liability of a guarantor, 
and by a statute in Florida enacted in 1965 the interest rate 
chargeable to the guarantor could not exceed 10% per annum. The 
lower court held that the 1965 statute did not effect the note 
execued in 1962. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed and held 
that the later statutory rate prevailed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs respectfully 
request that this Court reverse the lower court's determination 
that the defendant met the requirements of Flying Diamond in 
selecting the location of the well-site and road, that the Court 
determine that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the 
4.76 acres taken, together with severance damages, and that the 
Court determine that the plaintiffs are entitled to compensation 
for all of the foregoing damages at the highest and best use of 
the property, to-wit, residential purposes, that the Court 
determine that the property taken by the defendant has no residual 
value to plaintiffs of $375 p€>r acre, or of any other sum, and 
that the Court determine that plaintiffs are entitled to 
prejudment interest at the rate of 10% per annun, and that the 
i }?t ,<i\ : ' ., i«? r-^Qo -f-^  4-v»^  i^r^ny ^c:ft f ~-~~ 3, >^ termination of 
the ra;r :^rk- 4 .,-i. „• - • . iqnest n d b^st ^ ^ ^f t-h^ 
: r^0or*"
T
 - - -*• - * * "• i i| acres 
• r:*atos to severance damages to the remainder of 
plaint iff s f t ra«, y n i. •* * 
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GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
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225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL N. SMITH and, ] 
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, ) 
Def-jnu-i.it. 
) JUDGMENT 
Civil No.85-CV-2D 
(L^r/h^1-^ 
v^-^riild nia::er came on for '".rial before the 
Honorable Dennis L. Draney, judge of -he above court, sitting 
without a jury, on the z*- ^  ; id 6en ?f -•-» i1 ./Jf? - ~:' ,m\tffs 
were represented by Gordon Mad sen and Robert C. >"umnu:v:i 3, and 
the defendants were represented by Robert W. Adkins and Terry L, 
Christiansen* The plaintiffs having produced evidence, and the 
defendant hav1 - - -^ .k. .M evidence, and both sides having rested, 
and closing arguments having been presented by memoranda from the 
parties, =ind the 0-H.ir*-, hwir.-r heretof-"w j -• • ^r-i n.i.^q of 
Fact a;-^ • ^ „; ~.. ;. -. ^ _ .. /, 
NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion of Gordon A, Mads^n.arid 
^ . fiLED 
Rober t G . Cummi ng s , a t t o r n e y s fo r t h e D la. i n 11 f f s , °':' c'st'~,ct c^rt Duchesne 
^ State o/utaft 
S £ F
 /3 19P8 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs are hareby awarded judgment against the defendant in 
the sum of $16,065, together with interest thereon at the rate of 
twelve percent per annum from the. date hereof, together with costs 
in the amount of $ . 
DATED the JZ^LL— daY of ^>As^St^^c^4t 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE ^~ 
L 
0 
1 .; 
-L '* -ip 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing prcr '•&•' 
Judgment was mailed, to Robert W# Adkins and Terry l> Christiansen, 
attorneys for defendant, ? . 0. *o.c t^, Ccalvilli, Utah 84017, 
postage prepaid, this /,.-* day cf August., \'*» ;. 
/,,,-^s"r^^ —_ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL N. SMITH a n d , 
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No.85-£J£-2D 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Dennis L. Draney, judge of the above court, sitting 
without a jury, on the 5th and 6th of April, 1988. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C, Cummings, and 
the defendant was represented by Robert W. Adkins and Terry L. 
Christiansen. The plaintiffs having produced evidence, and the 
defendant having produced evidence, and both sides having rested, 
and closing arguments having been presented by memoranda from the 
parties, and the Court, being advised, makes and enters the 
following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Plaintiffs are, and during all material times were, 
owners of a twenty-acre tract of land located adjacent to the city 
limits :>'::. the town of Altamont i n Duchesne County described as 
follows: 
The East 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 cu r!ie Southwest w 4 
of Section 23, Township 1 xut'i, Rar^e 4 West, USM. 
2. On or about March 2*, ' <6^, in Oil and Gas Lease 
was entered into by Hyrum W. S>r.: th . r. ••.'j.ly M. Smith, hi s wife, 
as lessors, and Walter Duncan, as lessee- Plaintiffs, ... - all 
material times, were successors ir interest to said 1 "-c' - =• - to 
1 e s s o r '  s i n t e r e <. - --. i -' - i;: J *- a s LJe a s e , a n d ^ t- \ ma t e r x d ^  
times defendant was successor in interest - :> the lessee's interest 
in and to said Oil and Gas Lease. 
3. During the month of August 1983 the defendant 
entered upon the aforesaid 20-tract and placed in the southwest 
corner an oil well, an oil well ba+t^y' -tru ^ornq^ t" nk,^  , i the 
same time the defendant constructed an access road from the County 
road on the north to the said oil well, oil well battery and 
storage tanks, said road running n« * * ^  .* - ; — *• . *• ./ 
boundary of said tract. The oil well, oil well battery, storage 
tanks and road occupied 4.76 acres of the said 20-acre tract, and 
said 4.76 acres thus occupied by the defendant is here \ 'iaf ter 
referred - . : r,: -.veil-site." 
4. At the time of the entry by defendant as aforesaid 
the property was being used by piairrci1 ; - • *,-. , - .: -~. 
p u r p o s e s . 
5. The Court finds chat the defendant's choice of said 
well-site was reasonable and practical, ana the dealings ot 
defendant's agents with plaintiffs were carried out m good faith. 
6. In paragraph 8 of the said lease it is provided 
chat the leasee "shall pay for damage caused by its operations to 
growing crops on said land." The Court finds that the said well-
site had thereon growing crops within the meaning of said lease 
provision at the time of said defendant's entry thereon. The said 
use to which defendant has put the well-site is of such nature and 
duration that it is rendered unusable to plaintiffs for 
agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future, and such damage 
to growing crops and to said land for agricultural purposes 
amounts to virtually a total taking of the property by defendant, 
and the Court finds that the value of such taking by defendant can 
most accurately be measured by determining the fair market value 
of the well-site and deducting any residual value to the landowner 
after defendant's use has ended and the property restored. 
7. The Court finds that it would be inequitable (and 
contrary to said lease) to allow plaintiffs as damages only the 
minimal value of crops grown on the property for a given number of 
years, which term cannot now be determined. 
3. The Court finds that the fair market value of the 
weil-site at the time defendant entered thereon and construcced 
said improvements was $3,750 per acre. The Court finds that the 
most comoarable sales used by tne appraisers were the Cummings/ 
Rule sale at $3,530 per acre and the Wheeled''-: T '- y -,al' 
'I' tie Court uinds chat the sue iect property is 
close" tic .1 tTtfn than the comparables, cnus juSuLryi.i^ :u.:rt .l.^ner 
value, The Coj.rt further finds that *, * • \ .n : 
possible residual value to plaintiffs (nerei-»ai ter referred tc as 
"residual value"), which the Court ;:inr<- to ^ $375 n<^ a " ^ . 
9. The Court r <: d .. ,-u - * .. . - ,
 sr ^ p-5 
t.>j:'; resrora: ion wi ;h i.-gari to 1 „ 3 J? ac^^-i JC the sa:d ve , - -
site, tu- "hp Co.::*" njtr-ner finds tha*-. dr^'ice such qccd-laitn 
effort by defendant, the •» • • - ?tj •-.:, d 
plaintiffs' damages with respect thereto continue. 
10. The Court finds that plaintiffs n \v3 003*1 damaged 
in the amount oi th ."] i r'f ^ r^n^- *v_:.-,,.-.. f> _ - ,c:rKr, vt.^ue of 
$3,750 per acre and the residual value re tre owner of $3':"i per 
acre. The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs were damaged in 
the amount of $3,3""" 'v*r .i-r.- :' -'-, ' uj per acre fair maricet value 
less $375 per acre residual value) multiplied by 4.76 acres, 
yielding a total damage to the plaintiffs of ' U 6 , U O J . U U . 
!I. The Court" na-, n ; -u • ;ierermine the value 
of the taking ot the well-site for i-• .-lcertain period of time, 
and to fashion an equitable award based thereon, and therefore the 
Court finds that damages < . •.-v-r :->-;> measured - , . certain t i me 
or a* -:-,: .: ho certain figures, and therefore the Court finds 
that plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest. 
1 ' - : • -
JL. U JL 
- 4 -
12. The Court finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to 
damages on their theory of eminent domain, but are only entitled 
to be compensated for damage on the property used by defendant for 
its well-site for agricultural purposes as heretofore found by the 
Court. 
13. The Court further determines that there is no 
evidence that the defendant's use of the well-site adversely 
affected the agricultural use of the remainder of plaintiffs' 
property, and finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to severance 
damages. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS Of LAW: 
1. Plaintiffs are entitled no judgment against 
the defendant in the sum of $16,065 (based upon the virtual 
destruction of the property for agricultural purposes, and that 
the measure of such damages is the difference between the fair 
market value of the well-site at the time of defendant's entry and 
the aforesaid residual value), together with interest thereon at 
the rate of twelve percent per annum from the date hereof. 
2. Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages on any 
eminent domain theory, nor are plaintiffs entitled to severance 
damages. 
3. Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment 
interest. 
4. P l a in t i f f s are en t i t l ed to cos t s . 
DATED the ^'""^ d a y of ,<J(&t2/3>, ^ l , 1 9 8 8 . 
3Y THE COURT: 
^^' ^Xj^^^^^-^^y 
DISTRICT JUDGE ^ 1/ 
J :j 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed to Robert W. Adkins and 
Terry L. Christiansen, attorneys for defendant, P. 0. Box 660, 
Coalville, Utah 84017, postage prepaid, this / 'f - '* day of 
August, 1988. 
' Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARL N. SMITH and DAWNA 
LaVERNE SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant. 
R U L I N G 
Civil No. 85-CV-2D 
Having fully considered the evidence received and the closing 
arguments and memoranda of counsel, the court rules as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages on their 
theory of eminent domain, but are entitled to be compensated for 
the damage to crops on the property used by Defendant. 
2. The use to which Defendant has put the property is 
of such nature and duration that it is rendered unusable to the 
Plaintiffs for agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future. 
Thus, the extent of damage to crops amounts to virtually a total 
taking of the property by Defendant. To allow Plaintiffs only 
the minimal value of crops grown on that property for a number of 
years which cannot now be determined would not be equitable. 
3. The value of such a taking can most accurately be 
measured by determining the fair market value of the property and 
deducting any residual value to the landowner after D^ fei^ fejatJ^  
; ..i DISTRICT COURT DUChE.V 
use has ended and the property restored. w r r ^ . MTAM 
J. i JL 
^yi-
4. Defendant's choice of the well-site was reasonable 
and practical, and the dealings of Defendant's agents with 
Plaintiffs were carried out in good faith. 
5. There being no evidence that the Defendant's use of 
the property adversely affected the argicultural use of the 
remainder of Plaintiffs' property, Plaintiffs are not entitled to 
severance damages. 
6. The value of the property at the time the well-site 
was constructed was $3,750.00 per acre. The most comparable sales 
used by the appraisers were the Cummings/Rule sale, at $3,530.00 
per acre, and the Wheeler/Stanley sale at $3,300.00 per acre. The 
subject property is closer to a town than the cumparables, thus 
justifying a higher ^/a'ue. The property hat> some possible residual 
value to Plaintiffs, which the court determines to be $375.00 per 
acre. The court finds that despite good faith effort by Defendant, 
the 1.39 acre parcel has not been restored, and Plaintiffs' damages 
continue. Thus, Plaintiffs are awarded damages as follows: 
4.76 acres @ $3,375.00 per acre 
(3750 - 375) = $16,065.00 
7. Plaintiffs are not entitled to pre-judgment interest. 
The court has been required to determine the value of the taking 
of real estate for an uncertain period of time, and to fashion an 
equitable award based thereon. Thus, damages cannot be measured 
as of a certain time, or according to certain figures. 
DATED this %tl\ day of June, 19 88. 
BY THE COURT: 
£. v 
cc: Gordon Am Madsen i ^ 
E£otit8*a,io. B * OIL AND GAS L E A S f / j g g S B i W ^ ^ ^ ™ ^ 
THIS AGREEMENT, Entered into this the 2 9 t h
 d . v o f March 1 ^J 19 6 6 . 
w H v r u m W. S m i t h and E m i l y M . S m i t h , h i s . w i l e j 
Route 1, Box 45B. 
C l e a r f i e l d , Utah 
.hereinafter called lessor. 
mnd W a l t e r D u n c a n , P . Q, B o x 13 7 , D u r a n g o . C o l o r a d o hereinafter caned lessee, doe. «un<,.: 
One a n d m o r e - - - - - - - - - - - 1 . 0 0 & m o r e 
2. That leaaor, tor »nd in consideration of the »um of Dollars >* >. 
in hand paid, and of the covenants and agreement* hereinafter contained to be performed by the lessee, has this day granted and leased and hereby grants. 
leaaes and leta unto the lessee for the purpose of mining and operating for and producing oil and gas, casinghead gas and casmghead gasoline, laying pipe 
Unea. building tanks, storing oil. building powers, stations, telephone lines and other structures thereon to produce, save, take care of and manufacture all of 
T"^) LI c h e s n e 
such substances, and for housing and boarding employees, the following described tract of land In — — — — — 
Cauntf U t a h to-wit: 
T o w n s h i p 1 South , R a n g e 4 W e s t , USM: 
S e c t i o n 25: E | N W J S W J 
— ZTZ - - 2 0 . 00 
In '*T—t~-i Township . Range . and containing acre*, more or less 
2. This lease shall remain In force for a term of ten (10> years and as long thereafter as oil. gas. casinghead gas, caslnghead gasoline or any of them 
is produced. 
3 The lessee shall deliver to the credit of the lessor as royalty, free of cost. In the pipe line to which lessee may connect us wells the equal one-eighth 
part Of all oil produced and saved from the leased x>T^fiises. or at the lessee's option, may pay to the lessor for such one-eighth royulty the market price for 
oil of like grade and gravity prevailing on the day such oil is run into the pipe lane, or into storage tanks. 
4 The lessee shall pay lessor, as royalty, one-eighth of the proceeds from the sale of the gas. as such, for gus from wells where gas only is found, and 
where not sold shall pay Fifty i*30.00> Dollars per annum as royalty from each such welt. s,nd while such royalty is so paid such well .shall be held to be a 
producing well under paragraph numbered two hereof. The lessor to have gas free of charge from any gas well on the leased premi«cs for stove* and inside 
lights in the principal dwelling house on said land by making his own connections with the well, the use of said gas to be at the lessors sole risk and ex-
pense The lessee shall pay to lessor for gas produced from any oil well and used by the lessee for the manufacture of gasoline or any other product, as roy-
alty, one-eighth of the market value of such gas at the mouth of the veil. It said gas is sold by the lessee, then as. royalty one-eighth of the proceeds of 
the sale thereof. 
ft. If operations for the drilling of a well for oil or gas are not commenced on said land on or before one year from this date, this lease shall terminate 
as to both parties, unlesa the lassee shall, on or before one year from this date, pay or tender to the lessor or for the lessor's credit in the 
S t a t e S a v i n g s and L o a n A s s o c i a t i o n „
 u # C l e a r f i e l d , Utah 
Its successors, which bank and its successors are the lessor's agent and shall continue as the depository of any and/ all sums payable under this lease, re 
gardless of changes of ownership in said land or in the oil and gas. or in the rentals to accrue thereunder, the sum of H *L L 
*» — — <- — — — — » * * * — «'''— * " " * — "" **" " Z Z Z». "" "" "nnii^r, .« ^ ^ * W _> which shall operate a< 
rental and cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of drilling operations for a period of one year. In like manner and upon like payments or 
tenders, the commencement of drilling operations may be further deferred for like period .successively All payments or lenders may be made by check or 
draft of lessee or any assignee thereof, mailed or delivered on or before the rental paying date. Notwithstanding the death of the lessor, or his successor 
in Interest, the payment or tender of rentals in the manner provided above shall be binding on the heirs, devisees executors, and admuii.itrutors of such person. 
6. If at any time prior to the discovery of oil or gas on this land and during the term of this lease, the lessee shall drill a dry hole, or ho ,ns. on this land. 
this lease shall not terminate, provided operations for the drilling of a well shall be commenced within twelve months froun the expiration of t he last rental period 
for which rental has been paid, or provided that within said period the lessee begins or rcs.mcs the payment of rentals m the manner and amn-int herein above 
provided; und in this event the preceding paragraphs hereof governing the payment of r« r.tals and the manner and effect thereof ahull continue m force. 
7. In case said lessor owns a less interest in the above described land than the entire and undivided fee simple estate therein, then the royalties and 
rentals herein provided for shall be paid the said lessor only in the proportion which his interest bears to the whole and undivided fee. 
8. The lessee shall have the right to use free of cost, gas. oil and water found on said land for its operations thereon, except water from the wells of the 
lessor. When required by lessor, the lessee shall bury pipe lines below plow depth and shall pay for damage caused by its operations to crowing' crops on 
said land. No well shall be drilled nearer than 200 feet to the house or barn now on said prerniy.es without written consent of the lessor. Lessee shall have the 
right a: any time during or after the expiration of this lease to remove all machinery, fixtures. houses, buildings and other structures placed on said premises. 
Including the right to draw and remove all casing. 
9. If the estate of either party hereto Is assigned (and the privilege of assigning in whole or In part is expressly allowed*, the covenants hereof shall 
extend to the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, but no change of ownership in the land or in the rentals or royalties shall be binding 
on the lessee until after notice to the lessee and it has been furnished with the written transfer or assignment or a certified copy trureof. In the event this 
lease shall be assigned as to a part or as to parts of the above described lands, and the h^'.ier or owner of any such part or parts shall fail or make default 
In the payment of the proportionate part of the rent due from htm or them, such default .-.hall not operate to defeat or affect this lease tn so fur as it covers 
a part or parts of said land upon which the said lessee or any assignee hereof shall make due payment of said rentals. If at any time there be as many as 
four parties entitled to rentals or royalties, lessee m«v withhold payments thereof unless and until all parties designate, in writing, in a recordable instru-
ment to be filed with the lessee, a common agent to receive all payments due hereunder, and to execute divtMon and transfer orders on behalf of said parties, 
and their respective successors In title. 
10. Lessor hereby warrants and agrees to defend the title to the land herein described and acrccs that the lessee, at its option, may pay and discharge 
anj* taxes, mortgages, or other liens existing, levied, or assessed on or against the above described hinds and. in event it exercises such option, it shall be 
subrogated to the rights of any holder or holders thereof and may reimburse itself by applying to the discharge of auv such mortgage, tax or or» _r Hen. any 
royalty or rentals accruing hereunder. 
11. Notwithstanding anything in this lease contained to the contrary, it is expressly a creed that if lessee shall commence drilling operations at any time 
while this lease is in force, this lease shall remain in force and its term shall continue so long as such operations are prosecuted and. if production results 
therefrom, then as long as production continues. 
12. If within the primary term of this lease production on the Tensed premises shall ce..se from any cause, this lease shall not terminate provided opera-
tions for the drilling of a well shall be commenced before or on the next ensuing rental paying date: or. provided les.-ee begins or resumes the payment of 
rentals tn the manner and amount hereinbefore provided. If. after the expiration of the primary term of 'this lease, production on the leased premises shall 
cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate provided lessee resumes operations for drilling a well «ithm sixty • 60 • cav$ from such cc.»>ution. and this 
lease shall remajn in force during the prosecution of such operations and. if production re.-uit> therefrom, then as long as production continues. 
13. If the leased premise's shall hereafter be owned in severalty or in separate tracts. :he premises, never: heless. 'hall be developed and operated as one 
lease and all royalties accruing hereunder shall be treated as an entirety and thai! be divided among and paid to such separate owners in the proportion 
that the acreage owned by each such separate owner bears to the entire leased acreage There shall be no obligation on the part of the lessee to offset wells 
on separate tracts into which the land covered by this lease may be hereafter divided bv .ale. devise, or otherwise, or to furnish separate measuring or 
receiving tanks. It is hereby agreed that, in the event this lease shall be assigned a> to a part or as to parts of the above described lands, and the holder 
or owner of any such part or parts shall fail or make default in the payment of the proportionate part of the rent due from him or thnn. such default 
shall not operate to defeat o»* affect this lease in so far as it covers a part or parts or s*-.d lti\d upon which the said lessee or anv assignee hereof shall 
make due payment of said rentals. If at any time there be as many as four parties, entitled to rentals or rovalties. lessee mav withhold pavtner.ts thereof un-
less and until all parties designate, in writing, tn a recordable instrument to be filed with the lessee, a common agent to receive all payments due hereunder. 
and to execute division and transfer orders on behalf of said parties, and their respective successors in title. 
. H Lessee may at any time and from time to time surrender this lease as to any part or parts of the Icaacd premises by delivering or mailing & release 
thereof to the lessor, or by placing a release thereof of record in the proper county. 
15 This lease and all its terms, conditions, and stipulations shall extend to and be binding on all successors of said lessor or lessee. 
£ 13. This lease shall not be terminated, in whole or In part, nor shall lessee be hsrld liable in damages, for failure to complv with the express or lm-
pneo. covenants hereof, if compliance therewith is prevented by. or If such failure is the result of. any Fedtral or State laws, executive orders, rules, or 
recusations. If. at the end of the primary term hereof, such term has not been extended bv production or drilling as in this *.ea.>*? provided, and lessee, 
by reason of any of the above recited causes. Is unable to drill a well on the leased premises for oil or gas. the primarv term ^-id the rental provision 
hereof shal. be extended automatically lrou\ year tv» year until the first anniversary hr.-eyf occurring ninety 90» or more days fcI'.oTing the removal of such 
Relaying cause. During any period that lessee is unable to produce and or market any products from the leased premises by rc;ion of anv of the above 
recited causes, this lease shall remain in full force and effect. 
1 T
. Lessee Is hereby given the right at its option, at any time and from time to time, to pool or unitize all or anv part or part* of the above de-
scribed land with other land. lease, or leases in the immediate vicinity thereof, such pooling to be into units not exceeding the rr.ii.imum sl*«- tract on which 
a aeu may be drilled under laws, rules, or regulations »n force at the time of such pooling or unitization provided, however, that such units may exceed 
sucn minimum by not more than ten acres if such excess is necessary in order to conform to ownership subdivisions or lease lir.»> Lcs«-<«c shall exercise 
said option, as to each desired unit, by executing and recording an instrument identifying the unitized area Anv well drilled or operations conducted on 
m£i'. P*J o f _ r a / , S L L C n U P U s h * 1 J o c considered a well drilled or operations conducted under this lease, and there shall be allocated to the portion of the 
abo\e described land included vn any such unit such proportion of the actual production frtm all well* on such unit as lessor's interest. 11 anv in such 
TZ V««:.*f-a/!?JpuJ«» °r» * " " c r e * * e *>»>»*. *»*••'* t o t M l * ««tire acreage of such unit. And it .» understood and agreed that tne production so allocated shall 
#£,H^2I ,.? dw f o r , . * U P«rPose». including the payment or delivery of royalty, to be the e:.:ire production from the portion of the above described land In-
cluded in such unit in the same manner as though produced from the above described Isr.i under the terms of this lease. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign the day and year first above written. 
O S T I U M W. S M I T H l i Y R . SM 
M£ 
— J E M I I I Y T SMITH 
>.S r>>\l»JcVv, 
EE O F -
S T Y O F -
UTAH 
s s . A C K N O W L K D C i M K N T FOR I N D I V I D U A L ( K a n s . , OkU. , and Colo . ) 
B e f o r e m e , the undersisrncd, a N o t a r y Publ ic , w i th in and for said c o u n t y and s t a t e , on th is 
f sS,7^, / 
E m i l y TvT. Smithr his wife 
19. 66 
_^L 
t a l l y a p p e a r e d H . y r u i T l W . S m i t h 
e p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n to be the ident ical personJILwho e x e c u t e d the w i t h i n and f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t and a c k n o w l e d g e d to me 
t h e y p t o r u t c d the s a m e n« t h e i r fr»p a n d v o l u n t a r y act and deed f o r t h e u s e s and purpose? there in s e t f o r t h . 
I N W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , I h a v e h e r e u n t o s e t m y hand and offic>a+-s*al the day and y e o j H a s t aUove w r i t t e n 
o m m i s s i o n e x p i r e s - Notary "Public. 
TE O F 
N T Y O F - -} s s . A C K N O W L E D G M E N T F O R I N D I V I D U A L ( K a n s ^ O k l a . . a n S Colo . ) 
Be fore m e , the unders igned , a N o t a r y Publ ic , w i t h i n and f o r sa id c o u n t y and s t a t e , on t h i s -
i* 19 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d , 
e p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n to be the ident ica l person w h o e x e c u t e d t h e w i t h i n and foregoing: i n s t r u m e n t and a c k n o w l e d g e d to m e 
. e x e c u t e d the s a m e a s . - f r e e a n d v o l u n t a r y act and deed for t h e u s e s and p u r p o s e s there in s e t f o r t h . 
I N W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , I have h e r e u n t o s e t m y h a n d and of f ic ia l s ea l t h e day and y e a r last a b o v e w r i t t e n . 
o m m i s s i o n exp ires . . N o t a r y Publ i c . 
T E O F 
rNTY O F . 
On t h i s . 
" > S3. 
- d a y o f -
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T F O R C O R P O R A T I O N 
. , A. D. , ll> . b e f o r e me, the u n d e r s i g n e d , a N o t a r y Publ i c 
id for the c o u n t y and s t a t e a f o r e s a i d , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d , 
\e p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n to be the ident ica l person w h o s i g n e d t h e n a m e of the m a k e r t h e r e o f to the w i t h i n and f o r e g o i n g 
•ument a s i t s - - P r e s i d e n t and a c k n o w l e d g e d to m e t h a t . . e x e c u t e d the s a m e a s . - f r e e and 
n t a r y ac t and deed, and a s the f ree and v o l u n t a r y act and deed o f sa id c o r p o r a t i o n , for the u s e s and p u r p o s e s there in s e t f o r t h . 
Given u n d e r m y hand and sea l the d a y and y e a r las t a b o v e w r i t t e n . 
rommiss ion e x p i r e s -
N o t a r y Publ ic . 
S 
'i O 
i « 
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N O T E : W h e n s i g n a t u r e by mark in K a n s a s , sa id mark to be w i t n e s s e d by at l eas t one person and a l s o a c k n o w l e d g e d . 
F o r a c k n o w l e d g m e n t by mark . us«- r e g u l a r K a n s a s a c k n o w l e d g m e n t . 
\ T K O F 
U N T V O F - u s <r. A C K N O W L E D G M E N T F O R I N D I V I D U A L ( K a n s . , Okla. . and Colo. ) 
B e f o r e m e . the u n d e r s i g n e d , a N o t a r y Public , w i t h i n and for said c o u n t y and s t a t e , on t h i s , 
of——— . . li« . p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d 
me p e r s o n a l l y known to be the identical person w h o e x e c u t e d the wi th in and f o r e g o i n g ins t rument and a c k n o w l e d g e d to 
- e x e c u t e d the s a m e a s . free a n d v o l u n t a r y net and deeti for t h e u s e s and p u r p o s e s there in set for th . 
N VMTNh.SS VNHhRKOF, I have hereunto set my hand and offit ial seal the day and y e a r last a b o v e w r i t t e n . 
c o m m i s s i o n expires . 
N o t a r y Public . 
CONSIDERATION OF EXPERT OPINION 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the 
opinion of a witness to be received as evidence. An exception to 
this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who by 
education, study and experience has become an expert in any art, 
science or profession, and who is called as a witness, may give 
his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and which 
is material to the case. You should consider such expert opinion 
and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. [You are not 
bound, however, by such an opinion.] Give it the weight to which 
you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may 
reject it, [if in your judgment the reasons given for it are 
unsound.] 
***** 
BAJI 33 
Startin v. Madsen, Utah , 237 P.2d 834 
CONSIDERATION OF INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE 
If in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea be 
stated [has been stated] in vaying ways, no emphasis thereon is 
intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, you 
are not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual 
point or instruction, and ignore the others, but you are to 
consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in 
the light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. 
***** 
BAJI-2 
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co. 
1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 
Note: Hillyard overruled in unrelated matter, 
Harris v. Utah Transit, G71 P2d 217 
(Utah 1983). 
J2P36I26 
INSTRUCTION NO, 
During the course of this trial the State and 
the defendants have introduced the testimony of expert 
witnesses; these expert witnesses have expressed their 
opinion as to the fair market value of the defendants1 
property. You are instructed that the factors considered b^ 
the experts are not, in themselves, direct evidence of the 
fair market value of the land condemned, and such factors 
may be considered by you, the jury, only for the purpose of 
determining what weight, if any, you accorded to the 
testimony of any of the expert witnesses in his ultimate 
opinion as to the fair market value of the land in question 
as of the date of taking. 
J4P7I5 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In weighing the testimony of each witness relat-
ing to comparable sales, you may consider whether the 
parcels of land chosen are generally similar, particularly 
as to factors having a bearing on value, namely: whether 
they are in the same or different localities arid whether 
similarly situated; whether the topography and pnysical 
characteristics are similar; whether such other sales 
were voluntary on the part of both buyer and seller; what 
were the terms of payment and whether or not payments were 
so extended so as to substantially affect price; how close 
in time were such sales; and what adjustments were made by 
the witness with respect to the differences between the 
comparable sales and the subject property in arriving at 
his opinion as to the fair market value of the defendants1 
property. 
Such sales form a basis for the opinion regarding 
value of the witness relying thereon, but such sales, though 
reasonably comparable, are not to be considered as the sole 
test of fair market value herein. 
